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Copy 



THE 



HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE 



BY 
JOSEPH W. RICH 







REPRINTED FROM THE APRIL 1903 NUMBER OF 
THE IOWA JOURNAL OP HISTORY AND POLITICS 
PUBLISHED AT IOWA CITY IOWA BY 
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OP IOWA 



, 



THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE 



V** 



In Exchange 

s 

1907 



THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE 

On May 7, 1902, in the Senate of the United States, Sen- 
ator Tillman of South Carolina took occasion to refer to the 
Hampton Roads Conference of 1865. And for the purpose 
of showing, as he supposed, the willingness of President 
Lincoln to end the war on almost any terms, Senator Till- 
man undertook to state what was demanded and what 
occurred at that Conference. He said: 

The claim on the part of the North was, "Restore the Union; give 
us the Union;" and Alexander Stephens was told by Abraham 
Lincoln at the Hampton Roads conference to take a blank sheet of 
paper and write, "Save the Union;" and President Lincoln said, 
"Aleck, you fill out the balance, and I will agree to it." 1 

This statement by Senator Tillman is in substance a repe- 
tition of the story of the celebrated Conference which has 
gained some currency in recent years, having been used by 
no less a person than Mr. Henry Watterson in a jiublic lec- 
ture on Abraham Lincoln. Mi*. Watterson was corrected, 
however, by Hon. John II. Reagan, who at the time of the 
Conference was a member of the cabinet of the Confederate 
States. 

On the day following the statement made by Senator 
Tillman, Senator Vest arose in the Senate and observed that, 
while he did not desire to participate in the debate then 
going on, he felt compelled "in justice to both the living 



1 Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Seas., Vol. xxxv, p. 5100. 



and the dead" to notice the "remarkable assertion" made 
by Senator Tillman. Senator Vest then said: 

M r. President, I know personally, without having been present at 
that celebrated interview, that the incident is without the slighest 
foundation. If true, it would place the Government and officers of 
the Confederate States in the category of criminals, because, if true, 
the Confederacy was offered all that it ever demanded in the wildest 
hopes of the most extreme partisan of that war, if they would only 
return to the Union .... I happen to know from the lips of two of 
the commissioners, Alexander H. Stephens and R. M. T. Hunter, 
that no such incident ever occurred between the representatives of 
the United States and of the Confederate States at Hampton Roads. l 

Senator Vest said that he had further knowledge of the 
facts, having heard the "official report" made by the com- 
missioners after their return to Richmond. From these 
sources of information Senator Vest related what occurred 
as follows: 

When the commissioners, if I may so term the President and the 
Secretary of State of the United States, met the commissioners of the 
Confederacy, Mr. Lincoln, addressing himself to R. M. T. Hunter, 
whom he knew very well, said, "In the first place, gentlemen, I 
desire to know what are your powers and instructions from the Rich- 
mond Government?" avoiding, as Mr. Hunter told me himself, the 
words "Confederate States," but terming the Government that of 
the Richmond Government. Mr. Hunter, to whom the inquiry was 
addressed, said, "Mr. President, we are instructed to consider no 
proposition that does not involve the independence of the Confed- 
erate States of America." "Then," said Mr. Lincoln, "the inter- 
view had as well terminate now, for I must say to you gentlemen 
frankly and honestly that nothing will be accepted from the Govern- 
ment at Richmond except absolute and unconditional surrender." * 



1 Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. xxxv, p. 5160. 
'Ibid, p. 5160. 



Iii case these terms were accepted, President Lincoln fur- 
ther said (according to Senator Vest) that "the largest 
executive clemency " would be extended to "the leaders and 
generals of the Government at Richmond." "This termi- 
nated the interview," says Senator Vest; but, "as the com- 
missioners of the Confederacy retired from the chamber, 
Mr. Lincoln, addressing Stephens, said : ' Stephens, you are 
making a great mistake. Your Government is a failure, 
and when the crash comes, as it soon must come, there will 
be chaos, and disasters which we cannot now foresee must 
come to your people.' " * 

The account thus given, Senator Vest avers with the 
utmost assurance, is "substantially and almost word for 
word" as it came to him from the two commissioners named. 
Furthermore, he adds that "to put this matter beyond all 
sort of dispute, Judge Campbell .... took down in pencil at 
the interview, word for word, what passed between the 
commissioners;" and this "account in writing was exhibited 
to many of his [Campbell's] friends in the city of Rich- 
mond." Senator Vest says that he himself was told the 
story by a gentleman who had seen the written report, 
which was "almost exactly" as he had tried to relate it. 
He closed his remarks to the Senate as follows: 

I do not want this statement, which I have no doubt the Senator 
from South Carolina believes to be true, to go into the records of 
this country without my statement of these facts and my solemn 
denial that there is the shadow of truth in this assertion which lias 
been going the rounds of the newspapers of the country for the last 
few years.* 



1 Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. xxxv, p. 5160. 
*Ibid, p. 5160. 



Senator Vest has done a distinct service to the truth of 
history in thus publicly and in such a conspicuous manner 
denying the popular story as to what occurred at the Hamp- 
ton Roads Conference — an event big with possibilities but 
without result, unless we accept as a result the knowledge 
that the war must continue until ended on the field of battle. 

Senator Tillman having been corrected by Senator Vest, 
it is now in order to correct Senator Vest by documentary 
evidences 1 and by the testimony of Mr. Alexander H. 
Stephens, one of the commissioners of the Confederate 
States and their chief spokesman at the celebrated Confer- 
ence. Soon after the event Mr. Stephens put into enduring 
form his recollections of what occurred. 2 Senator Vest's 
account is from his own memory of what was told to him 
thirty-seven years ago. From his account it must be in- 
ferred that the interview was of short duration, if, as Sen- 
ator Vest would have us believe, President Lincoln delivered 
the ultimatum of "unconditional surrender." It must also 
be inferred from Senator Vest's account that Mr. Hunter 
was the chief spokesman for the Confederate commissioners, 
that Judge Campbell was a stenographer, and that he made 
a verbatim report of what was said. Neither of the three 
propositions is true, as will be seen from the more reliable 
evidences and testimony which follow. The interview was 
of "several hours duration" according to President Lincoln; 
it was "about four hours" long according to Mr. Stephens. 



1 The documents are found in Lincoln's special message to the 
House of Representatives, Feb. 10, 1865 — See 3fessages and Papers 
of the Presidents, Vol. vi, pp. 260-269. 

*^i Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States. 1867. 



No record was kept by any person ; nor was any person per- 
mitted to take notes at the interview of what was said. 
There can be no doubt but that Mr. Stephens, being at the 
head of the Confederate commission, was its chief spokes- 
man. 

SOME OTHER ACCOUNTS OF THE CONFERENCE 

Mr. Edward S. Ellis in The History of Our Country 
(piotes at considerable length from Wm. E. Cameron's "full 
and accurate account," 1 of which the following is an ex- 
tract : 

The inception of the Conference was a visit to Richmond of 
Francis P. Blair, Sr., armed with a letter from Mr. Lincoln, in which 
the latter expressed his willingness to receive delegates from "those 
in authority in the Southern States who desire to make peace on the 
basis of one common country." ' 

This part of Mr. Ellis' account is not true in any essential 
particular. Mr. Blair was not sent by anybody; nor was 
he on his first trip "armed with a letter" or with anything 
else except a pass through the lines; nor is the quotation, 
purporting to have been made from President Lincoln's let- 
ter which was borne by Mr. Blair on his second trip, cor- 
rectly made either in words or in sentiment, as will be seen 
by the letter below. 3 

Mr. Cameron's account of the opening of the Conference, 
quoted by Ellis, is as follows: 

Mr. Stephens opened the business in hand by stating clearly and 
with precision the conditions which the Confederates were instructed 
to lay before the President of the United States. 



1 Volume v, p. 1311. 
*Ibid, p. 1311. 
"See below p. 12. 



8 

This implies of course that the Confederate commissioners 
were present with an ultimatum to the President of the 
United States, instead of being present to suggest a diversion 
in the hope of securing by secret convention at least a tem- 
porary cessation of hostilities. In these respects the Cam- 
eron story is entirely misleading. 

Other short accounts of the Conference are found in 
Schouler's History of the United States, 1 and Scribner\s 
Popular History of the United States. 2 Neither of these 
accounts, however, is full enough to convey a satisfactory 
idea of the Conference. 

For a full and accurate account of the Hampton Roads 
Conference from its inception to its conclusion we must turn 
to ( 1 ) the special message of President Lincoln of February 
10, 1865, 3 (2) A Constitutional View of the Late War 
Bettoeen the States, by Alexander H. Stephens, 4 (3) Abra- 
ham Lincoln, by Nicolay and Hay, and (4) the Rise and 
Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jefferson Davis. 



1 Volume VI, p. 535. 

'Volume v, p. 325. 

'Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume vi, p. 260. On 
the 10th day of February, in response to a resolution of the House 
for information, President Lincoln sent a special message giving all 
of the documents in the case and briefly stating the main points dis- 
cussed and stating that "the conference ended without result." On 
the same date, the Senate was "referred" to the documents trans- 
mitted to the House, and in addition thereto, the Senate was fur- 
nished with the "instructions" sent to Minister Adams in London, 
touching the affair, which instructions in no material points differ 
from Mr. Stephens' account. 

4 Mr. Stephens was Vice President of the Confederate States. His 
two volume work was written in 1867. 



MR. BLAIR'S MISSION TO RICHMOND 

\Yho was Francis P. Blair, Sr., the self-appointed mes- 
senger to the President of the Confederate States prior to 
the Hampton Roads Conference? Mr. Davis calls him "a 
distinguished citizen of Maryland." Mr. Stephens styles 
him the "Warwick" of the Republican party. He was for 
many years a prominent editor and politician, coming into 
notice as a Jackson Democrat in opposition to South Caro- 
lina Nullification. He was a friend and counsellor of 
Andrew Jackson himself. Later he became a Freesoil Dem- 
ocrat (Barnburner); and finally he appears as a Republican. 
He was intimately acquainted with leading men, North and 
South, and was on personally friendly terms with Mr. Jef- 
ferson Davis. 

In the latter part of the year 1864, Mr. Blair thought that 
he might do something to bring about peace by an interview 
with Mr. Davis. He suggested the thought to President 
Lincoln but got no encouragement from that quarter, not 
even a chance to explain himself. Mr. Lincoln, however, 
said to him finally and evasively: "Come to me after Savan- 
nah falls." 1 Mr. Blair was promptly on hand after that 
event, and was given a card with these words: 

December 28, 1864. 
Allow the bearer, F. P. Blair, sr. , to pass our lines, go South, 
and return. A. Lincoln. 2 

With this and this only he passed the lines and arrived 
at Richmond on January 12, 1865, where his appearance 



1 Nil olay and Hay's Abraham Lincoln, Vol. x, p. 94. 

2 Messages and Paper.* of the Presidents, Vol. vi, p. 260. 



10 

"caused no little sensation." An interview was promptly 
had with Mr. Jefferson Davis, which was introduced with 
an explanation by Mr. Blair as to the means used to procure 
the pass. Mr. Blair avowed his individual responsibility in 
the matter. Among the first questions propounded to Mr. 
Davis was one as to whether "he had any commitments 
with European powers," if he was free to answer such a 
question, "which would control his conduct in making 
arrangements with the Government of the United States." 
To this Mr. Davis replied that he "was absolutely free and 
would die a free man iu all respects." 

This opened the way for Mr. Blair to read a paper 
embodying his idea — a paper which he had prepared to be 
submitted to Mr. Davis in case a personal interview could 
not be had. It begins as follows: 

The Amnesty Proclamation of President Lincoln in connection 
with his last Message to Congress .... presents a basis on -which I 
think permanent peace and union between the warring sections of 
our country may be re-established. l 

Slavery being "doomed," a fact "admitted now on all 
sides," continued Mr. Blair, "the issue is changed and war 
against the Union becomes a war for monarchy." Having 
developed these ideas, Mr. Blair then reviewed the condi- 
tions in Mexico, and said: "Jefferson Davis is the fortunate 
man who now holds the commanding position to encounter 
this formidable scheme of conquest." In order to carry 
out the scheme it would first be necessary to arrange an 
armistice so that as much of the Confederate army as might 
be needed could be transferred to Texas. Juarez, the Mex- 



1 Nicolay and Hay's Abraham ^Lincoln, Vol. x, p. 97. 



11 

ican leader, was to be "propitiated," and very likely Mr. 
Davis himself might be proclaimed dictator. 

In case the "Mexican recruits and the army of the South" 
proved unequal to the task, it was suggested that "multi- 
tudes of the army of the North" would take a hand, and 
together they would sweep the invaders out of Mexico. 
Having presented his plan much more in detail than is pos- 
sible in this connection, Mr. Blair said: "There is my 
problem Mr. Davis; do you think it possible to be solved?" 
After some reflection Mr. Davis answered: "I think so." 1 

The interview continued for some time and various points 
were discussed. It terminated with the understanding that 
Mr. Blair would sound President Lincoln on the subject. 
It will be noted that the plan here presented to Mr. Davis 
did not contenqdate a uniting of the Confederate and Union 
forces to drive Maximilian out of Mexico. It was to be a 
Confederate movement to be made possible by means of an 
armistice. After the interview Mr. Davis made a memor- 
andum of the conversation, and on the day following sub- 
mitted it to Mr. Blair. This memorandum was mutually 
agreed to be substantially correct. It is substantially cor- 
roborative of Mr. Blair's account, except that Mr. Davis con- 
strued the proposed movement on Mexico to be a joint one 
in support of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Blair was then fur- 
nished with the following to be shown to President Lincoln: 
-p x> tj, .... v -. Richmond, Va., January 12, 1805. 

r . r. rSLAIE, r.sc,*. J 

Silt: I have deemed it proper, and probably desirable to you, to 

give you in this form the substance of remarks made by me, to be 

repeated by you to President Lincoln, etc., etc. 

I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing, now 

1 Nicolay and Hay's Abraham Lincoln, Vol. x, p. 103. 



1-2 

as heretofore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace, 
and am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to sup- 
pose it will be received, or to receive a commission if the United 
States Government shall choose to send one. That notwithstanding 
the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise that 
a commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint 
one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference with 
a view to secure peace to the two countries. 

Yours, etc., Jefferson Davis. 1 

Armed with this proposition to enter into conference with 
a view to secure peace to the two countries, Mr. Blair re- 
turned to Washington and received the following, with a 
view of securing peace to the people of our one common 
country, to be shown to Mr. Davis. 

Washington, January 18, 1865. 
F. P. Blair, Esq. 

Sir: Your having shown me Mr. Davis's letter to you of the 12th 

instant, you may say to him that I have constantly been, am now, 

and shall continue ready to receive any agent whom he or any other 

influential person now resisting the national authority may informally 

send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our one 

common country. Yours, etc. , A. Lincoln. 1 

Mr. Blair returned to Richmond and delivered the above 
to Mr. Davis, at the same time stating (according to Mr. 
Davis) that he (Blair) had "modified the views he formerly 
presented," and had "a different mode of procedure" to 
offer, to the effect that, ' ' on account of the extreme men in 

Congress and elsewhere, it would not be feasible 

for him [President Lincoln] to enter into any arrangement 
with us by the use of political agencies; that, if anything 
beneficial could be effected, it must be done without the in- 



' Messages ami Papers of the Presidents, Vol. vi, pp. 260, 261. 



13 

tervention of the politicians. He, therefore, suggested that 
Generals Lee and Grant might enter into an arrangement by 
which hostilities would be suspended." 

To this Mr. Davis replied that he was willing to entrust 
such a negotiation to General Lee. Later on Mr. Blair in- 
formed Mr. Davis that "the idea of a military convention 
was not favorably received at Washington;" and "so it only 
remained for me," says Mr. Davis, -'to act upon the letter 
of Mr. Lincoln." 

On the day following Mr. Blair's departure from Rich- 
mond, Mr. Davis, before consulting with his cabinet, called 
Mr. Stephens ( Vice-President of the Confederate States) into 
consultation, disclosed to him Mr. Blair's mission, and asked 
his advice. Though not hopeful of any good results, Mr. 
Stephens thought a conference desirable, and suggested that 
the two Presidents were the persons to be brought together 
if possible. To this Mr. Davis demurred, and then Mr. 
Stephens suggested the names of three persons, only one of 
whom was finally appointed, as commissioners. A cabinet 
meeting was held immediately after this interview', and Mr. 
Stephens' next information was that R. M. T. Hunter (Sen- 
ator), Judge John A. Campbell ( Asst. Sec. of War), and 
himself had l>eeu appointed. Mr. Stephens strongly objected 
to the selection both of himself and of Mr. Hunter on the 
ground that absence from their accustomed official duties 
would attract notice, whereas it was important to observe 
"the most perfect secrecy." 1 

Mr. Stephens makes no mention of either verbal or writ- 



'.1 Constitutional View of the Ziate War Between the States, by 
Alexander II. Stephens, Vol. n, Colloquy xxm. 



14 

ten instructions to the commission, but each commissioner 
was furnished with the following dated Richmond, January 
28, 1865: 

In conformity with the letter of Mr. Lincoln, of which the forego- 
ing is a copy, you are requested to proceed to Washington City for 
an informal conference with him upon the issues involved in the 
existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two coun- 
tries. 1 

The commissioners reached the Union lines January 29, 
at Petersburg (Gen. Wilson commanding), and asked to be 
passed through "in accordance with an understanding .... 
with Lieutenant- General Grant." To this the Secretary of 
War replied that the Department had no knowledge of such 
an "understanding " (nor was there any), and they were 
n< >t permitted to pass. On the next day the commissioners 
addressed a note to General Grant at City Point asking "to 
pass your lines under safe -conduct, and to proceed to Wash- 
ington." The request was sent to the President, and at the 
same time orders were sent by Grant to pass the commis- 
sioners on to headquarters, where they arrived on the same 
day. On the same day also (Jan. 30) a messenger was 
sent from Washington to meet the commissioners and to 
inform them that they would be allowed to pass the lines to 
Fortress Monroe "for the purpose of an informal confer- 
ence on the basis of the letter" of January 18, 1865. The 
reply of the commissioners to the instructions of the mes- 
senger was not "satisfactory," and it was so reported. The 
commissioners then addressed a second request to General 



1 T7ie Rise and Full of the Con federate Government, by Jefferson 
Davis, Vol. n, p. 01 1. 



15 

Grant to be passed on to Washington "to confer informally 
with the President," which of course was not granted. 1 

While this correspondence was in progress, President 
Lincoln dispatched Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, to 
Fortress Monroe, where he arrived February 1st under 
instructions from the President that, in the expected inter- 
view, "three things are indispensable," to wit: 

1. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the 
States. 

2. No receding by the Executive of the United States on the 
slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual 
message to Congress and in preceding documents. 

:i. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and the 
disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government. 8 

After all of these preliminaries, because of the unsatisfac- 
tory reply of the commissioners to the instructions of the 
special messenger, the President was about to recall Mr. 
Seward when he received through the War Department (on 
February 2d) a dispatch from General Grant, 3 which not 
only determined him to let the interview take place but to 
join Mr. Seward, which he did on February 2d, having sent 



1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. vi, pp. 262, 265. 

'Messages ami Papers of the Presidents, Vol. vi, p. 264. 

* Grant's confidential dispatch which determined the President to 
join Mr. Seward is as follows: 
"Host. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

"Now that the interview between Major Eckert, under his written 
instructions, and Mr. Stephens and party has ended, I will state con- 
fidentially, but not officially to become a matter of record, that I am 
convinced upon conversation with Messrs. Stephens and Hunter that 
their intentions are good and their desire sincere to restore peace and 
union. I have not felt myself at liberty to express even views of my 



16 

orders to Grant to "let nothing which is transpiring change, 
hinder, or delay your military movements or plans." The 
interview took place on board a United States steamer, in 
Hampton Roads, near Fortress Monroe, February 3, 1865. * 

THE ACCOUNT OF THE CELEBRATED CONFERENCE AS GIVEN BY 
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS 

After the formal salutations, inquiries after mutual ac- 
quaintances, and brief reminiscences of other days, Mr. 
Stephens said "in substance:" 

Well, Mr. President, is there no way of putting an end to the pres- 
ent trouble, and bringing about a restoration of the general good 
feeling and harmony tht n existing between the different States and 
Sections of the country? 



own or to account for my reticency. This has placed me in an 
awkward position, which I could have avoided by not seeing them in 
the first instance. I fear now their going back without any expres- 
sion from anyone in authority will have a bad influence. At the 
same time, I recognize the difficulties in the way of receiving these 
informal commissioners at this time, and do not know what to recom- 
mend. I am sorry, however, that Mr. Lincoln cannot have an inter- 
view with the two named in this dispatch, if not all three now within 
our lines. Their letter to me was all that the President's instruc- 
tions contemplated to secure their safe conduct if they had used the 
same language to Major Eckert [special messenger]. 

"U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 
See Messages aial Papers of the Presidents, Vol. vi, p. 266. 

1 There is a curious error in a date, which is perhaps worth men- 
tioning, found in the report of the Confederate commissioners to 
Mr. Davis. As printed in Mr. Stephens' ^4 Constitutional Vit w of 
the Late War Between the states. Vol. n, Appendix R, p. 792, the 
date of the Conference is given as "the 30th inst.," which would be 
February 30th, if there could be such a date. In Mr. Davis' The 
Risi and Fall of the Cmifederati (,'nrer/ime/it, Vol. II, p. 619, the 
date is given as "the 30th ult.," which would be the 30th of January. 
The true date was as given in the text above, February 3, 1865. 



17 

Mr. Seward said: It is understood, gentlemen, that this is to be 
an informal Conference. There is to be no clerk or secretary — no 
writing or record of anything that is said. All is to be verbal. 

I, speaking for the Commissioners, said that was our understand- 
ing of it. To this all assented, whereupon I repeated the question. 

Mr. Lincoln in reply said, in substance, that there was but one 
way that he knew of, and that was, for those who were resisting the 
laws of the Union to cease that resistance. All the trouble came 
from an armed resistance against the National Authority. 

But, said I, is there no other question that might divert the atten- 
tion of both Parties, for a time, from the questions involved in their 

present strife, until the passions on both sides might cool, ? 

Is there no Continental question, said I, which might thus tempo- 
rarily engage their attention? We have been induced to believe that 
there is. l 

This reference to a "Continental question" brought from 
Mr. Lincoln the response: "I suppose you refer to some- 
thing that Mr. Blair has said." He at once disavowed 
authority for anything and everything that may have been 
said or done by Mr. Blair, but said that he was "always 
willing to hear propositions for peace" on the basis of '"the 
restoration of the Union," which with him was a u sme qua 
non." There was silence for a few moments, when Mr. 
Stephens said: 

But suppose, Mr. President, a line of policy should be s'uggested, 
which, if adopted, would most probably lead to a restoration of the 
Union without further bloodshed, would it not be highly advisable 
to act on it, even without the absolute pledge of ultimate restoration 
being required to be first given? May not such a policy be found to 
exist in the line indicated by the interrogatory propounded? Is there 
not now such a Continental question in which all the parties engaged 



',•1 Constitutional View <>f tlie Late War Between t/n States, by 
Alexander H. Stephens, Vol. II, pp. 599, GUO. 



18 

in our present war feel a deep and similar interest? I allude, of 
course, to Mexico, and what is called the 'Monroe Doctrine,' — the 
principles of which are directly involved in the contest now waging 
there. ' 

In further elaboration of the question, Mr. Stephens said: 

We are under the impression that the Administration at Wash- 
ington is decidedly opposed to the establishment of an Empire in 
Mexico by France, and is desirous to prevent it. In other words, 
they wish to sustain the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and that, 
as I understand it, is, that the United States will maintain the right 
of Self -Government to all Peoples on this Continent, against the 
dominion or control of any European power. 

Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward both concurred in the expression of 
opinion that such was the feeling of the majority of the people of the 
North. 

Could not both Parties then, said I, in our contest, come to an 
understanding and agreement to postpone their present strife, by a 
suspension of hostilities between themselves, until this principle is 
maintained in behalf of Mexico; and might it not, when successfully 
sustained there, naturally, and would it not almost inevitably, lead 
to a peaceful and harmonious solution of their own difficulties? 
Could any pledge now given, make a permanent restoration or re- 
org nization of the Union more probable, or even so probable as 
such a result would? 

Mr. Lincoln replied with considerable earnestness, that he could 
entertain no proposition for ceasing active military operations, which 
was not based upon a pledge first given, for the ultimate restoration 

of the Union and the only basis on which he would entertain 

a proposition for a settlement was the recognition and re- establish- 
ment of the National Authority throughout the land. * 

This answer seemed about to close the interview, as the 



1 A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, by 
Alexander H. Stephens, Vol. n, pp. 601, 602. 



lit 

commissioners had no authority to give pledges, when Judge 
Campbell inquired in what way a settlement might be ef- 
fected, supposing the Confederate States were to accept the 
conditions. But Mr. Seward desired, before answering 
Judge Campbell's question, to have the other subject more 
fully developed, as it seemed to him to have a "philo- 
sophical basis." And so Mr. Stephens gave his views at 
length on the Monroe Doctrine and on popular government, 
and it seemed to him that the situation in Mexico might 
"afford a very opportune occasion for reaching a proper 
solution of our own troubles without any further effusion of 
fraternal blood. " 1 

This play upon the Monroe Doctrine was evidently not 
sincere, for it ended with a declaration by Mr. Hunter that 
"there was not unanimity in the South upon the subject of 
undertaking the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, and it 
was not probable that any arrangement could be made by 
which the Confederates would agree to join in sending any 
portion of their Army into Mexico." In this view he ex- 
pressed the joint opinion of the commissioners, says Mr. 
Stephens. 

From this excursion into the realms of speculation, Mi'. 
Lincoln brought the Conference back to business by declar- 
ing that "he could enter into no treaty, convention or stipu- 
lation, or agreement with the Confederate States, jointly or 
separately, upon that or any other subject, but upon the 
basis first settled, that the Union was to be restored." 

Judge Campbell then repeated his question, and the Pres- 



' A Constitutional View of the Late War Between tin States, by 
Alexander H. Stephens, Vol. n, p. 604. 



20 

ident replied that restoration could take place "by disband- 
ing their armies and permitting the National Authorities to 
resume their functions." This point was emphasized by 
Mr. Seward by calling the attention of the commissioners 
to the President's last annual message as embodying his 
views on that branch of the subject, and quoting therefrom 
from memory. After some further discussion, Mr. Stephens 
propounded another question as follows: 

I asked Mr. Lincoln what would be the status of that portion of 
the Slave population in the Confederate States, which had not then 
become free under his Proclamation; or in other words, what effect 
that Proclamation would have upon the entire Black population? 
Would it be held to emancipate the whole, or only those who had, 
at the time the war ended, become actually free under it? 1 

Mr. Lincoln answered that it was "a judicial question," 
and he could not say how the courts would decide it. He 
was of opinion, however, that the Proclamation, "was a 
war measure, and would have effect only from its being an 
exercise of the war power, as soon as the war ceased, it 
would be inoperative for the future. It would be held to 
apply only to such slaves as had come under its operation 
while it was in active exercise. This was his individual 
opinion, but, "the Courts might decide the other way;" and 
he declared that "he never would change or modify the 
terms of the Proclamation in the slightest particular." 

Mr. Stephens asked what relation the Confederate States 
would sustain to other States in case the war was abandoned. 
"Would they be admitted to representation in Congress? 



M Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, by 
Alexander H. Stephens, Vol. II, p. 610. 



21 

Mr. Lincoln very promptly replied, that his own individual 
opinion was, they ought to be. He also thought they would 
be; but he could not enter into any stipulation upon the 
subject." 1 

Being further pressed on the subject of a cessation of 
hostilities, the President replied that he could not enter into 
any arrangements "with parties in arms against the Govern- 
ment;" and so Mr. Hunter undertook to remove this diffi- 
culty by citing the fact that "enteriug into agreements with 
persons in arms against the acknowledged rightful public 
authority" was no new thing; and he cited the case of 
Charles I of England, to which Mr. Lincoln replied: "I 
do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters 
I will turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect 
about the case of Charles I, is, that he lost his head in the 
end." 

Mr. Stephens urged upon the President the view that, if 
he was justified in issuing the Emancipation Proclamation 
as a war measure, as a like war measure he might certainly 
enter into some stipulation with the same object in view to 
end the war. The President "then went into a prolonged 
course of remarks about the Proclamation. He said it was 
not his intention in the beginning to interfere with Slavery 
iu the States; that he never would have done it," except to 
"maintain the Union;" that it raised many "difficult and 
perplexing cpiestions;" that he favored "prohibiting the 
extension of slavery," but believed that the Government 
possessed no "power over the subject in the States;" and 

1 A Constitutional View of the "Late War Between tin States, by 
Alexander H. Stephens, Vol. n, p. (512. 



22 

that he favored emancipation, but not immediate, "even by 
the States." Mr. Stephens then goes on: 

After pausing for some time, his head rather bent down, as if in 
deep reflection, while all were silent, he rose up and used these words, 
almost, if not, quite identical: 

Stephens, if I were in Georgia, and entertained the sentiments I 
do — though, I suppose, I should not be permittted to stay there long 
with them; but if I resided in Georgia, with my present sentiments, 
I'll tell you what I would do, if I were in your place: I would go 
home and get the Governor of the State to call the Legislature 
together, and get them to recall all the State troops from the war; 
elect Senators and Members to Congress, and ratify this Constitu- 
tional Amendment prospectively, so as to take effect — say in five 
years. Such a ratification would be valid in my opinion. I have 
looked into the subject, and think such a prospective ratification 
would be valid. Whatever may have been the views of your people 
before the war, they must be convinced now, that Slavery is doomed. 
It cannot last long in any event, and the best course, it seems to me, 
for your public men to pursue, would be to adopt such a policy as 
will avoid, as far as possible, the evils of immediate emancipation. 
This would be my course, if I were in your place. ' 

After some further discussion of the slavery side of the 
question, Mr. Hunter recapitulated the subjects discussed 
and arrived at the result that nothing had been offered "but 
an unconditional surrender on the part of the Confederate 
States and their people. There could be no agreement, no 
treaty, nor even any stipulations as to terms — nothing but 
unconditional submission. " 

Mr. Stephens says this "summation" was given with "a 
good deal of force," to which Mr. Seward replied that "no 



*A Constitutional View "f tin LaU War Between tin States, by 
Alexander H. Stephens, Vol. n, p. 614. 



23 

words like unconditional submission bad been used, or any 
importing, or justly implying degradation, or humiliation 

even, to the people of the Confederate States." lie thought 
that submission to the "laws under the Constitution" could 
not be considered as "unconditional submission to con- 
querors, or as having anything humiliating in it." To this, 
Mr. Hunter replied: "But you make no agreement that 
these rights [ U11 der the Constitution] will be so held and 
secured." Mr. Lincoln replied to this by saying that as far 
as "the Confiscation Acts, and other penal acts, were con- 
cerned, their enforcement was left entirely with him," that 
he was willing to be "full and explicit" on that point, and 
that "he should exercise the power of the Executive with 
the utmost liberality." Mr. Stephens observes further that 
Lincoln "went on to say that he would be willing to be 
taxed to remunerate the Southern people for their slaves. 
He believed the people of the North were as responsible 
for slavery as the people of the South, and if the war should 
then cease, with the voluntary abolition of slavery by the 
States, he should be in favor, individually, of the Govern- 
ment paying a fair indemnity for the loss to the owners." 
But on this subject, he said that he "could give no assur- 
ance." ' 

This practically brought the Conference to a conclusion; 
and after some arrangements for a special exchange of pris- 
oners, Mr. Stephens said : "I wish Mr. President, you would 
re-consider the subject of an Armistice on the basis which 
has been suggested. " Taking Mr. Stephens' hand ' ' for a 

l A Constitutional Vieio of the L<tt< War Between tin stutix, by- 
Alexander II. Stephens, Vol. II, p. 617. 



24 

farweU leave," Mr. Lincoln replied: "Well, Stephens, I 
will re-consider it, but I do not think my mind will change, 
but I will re-consider." 

And so the historic Conference ended after a full, fair, 
and dispassionate discussion of the momentous question of 
peace by compromise. In that group of statesmen, anchored 
out upon the waters of the dee}) blue sea, Abraham Lincoln 
was the imposing figure, holding absolutely in his hand the 
fate of a continent. With another man in his place and 
another man than Grant at City Point, the current of polit- 
ical events might have changed its course in an hour. 
Within ten weeks of this time the Confederacy had col- 
lapsed, and President Lincoln had fallen at the hands of an 
assassin — Lincoln, the best and truest friend of the fallen 
cause. 

The commissioners on the way back to Richmond had 

another interview with General Grant, who "evidently," 

says Mr. Stephens, "regretted very much that nothing had 

been accomplished by the Conference." In Richmond 

"everybody was very much disappointed, and no one 

seemed to be more so than Mr. Davis." Mr. Stephens 

himself still entertained a lingering hope that Mr. Lincoln 

would "re-consider" and that something might yet come 

of it. 

Joseph W. Rich 
Iowa City, Iowa 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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